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GUANTÁNAMO BODIES:
LAW, MEDIA, AND BIOPOWER
CARY FEDERMAN & DAVE HOLMES

“What’s worse than a Muselmann?
Does he even have the right to live?”
—Agamben (1999, 171)

Introduction
The purpose of this article is to explain the status of those who are detained at
Guantánamo Bay. Stated broadly, in assessing that status, we will emphasize
the connection between the altered meaning of sovereignty that has
accompanied the placing of prisoners in an American penal colony in Cuba and
the biopolitical status of the prisoners who reside there. More particularly, we
will locate the points of convergence among the factors (the war on terror,
sovereignty, and the media) that have produced and reconstituted the legal and
ethical status of Guantánamo detainees. In this Introduction, we describe the
three factors that have framed the detainees’ status as something other than
prisoners of war by connecting the situation of the detainees to the idea of the
Muselmann, the outcast of the Auschwitz concentration camp system.
First, the war on terror. Apart from the reality of war on the battlefield,
the war on terror also exists within a discursive framework. The war on terror
has revivified an interest in the theological and political differences between
Christianity and Islam. It has created a discourse of dangerousness based on the
religion of those who hijacked the planes that crashed into the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001, as well as the religion of those captured in Iraq
and Afghanistan (Sengupta and Masood, 2005). Casting the war on terror in
theological and political terms, Alberto Gonzales, President George W. Bush’s
Attorney General, told some journalists that al Qaeda is different from all other
enemies America has faced because it does “not cherish life” (Hersh, 2004, 5).
Indeed, President Bush went further than his Attorney General by
characterizing the war against al Qaeda as only part of the larger global war on
terror. For President Bush, the global war on terror is one that may never end,

www.mediatropes.com

MediaTropes Vol III, No 1 (2011)

Cary Federman & Dave Holmes / 59

because the enemy is stateless, relentless, and potentially everywhere.
Consequently, President Bush, in an important address to the American people
following the events of September 11, saw fit to flesh out the implications of
fighting an enemy that does not cherish life by warning the American people
that they “should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any
other we have ever seen,” because the global war on terror will not be limited
by the requirements of the laws of war. Effectively, a state of emergency had
created a state of exception, where the norms of lawful behavior recede in favor
of the more pressing concerns over security and the meaning of life itself:
It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert
operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of
funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to
place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue
nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation,
in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with
us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any
nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be
regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. (Bush, 2001)
In the second part of this article, we discuss the reconfigured meaning of
sovereignty as a factor in the reconstitution of the Guantánamo detainee as an
enemy combatant who can be denied the privileges of prisoners of war. The
traditional goal of sovereignty is to “establish the essential unity of power” on
three “elements”: “subject, unitary power, and law” (Foucault, 2003, 44). For
Michel Foucault, however, the “juridical existence of sovereignty” no longer
categorizes subjectivity. “For a long time,” Foucault writes, “one of the
characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and
death” (1990b, 135). Now, wars are “waged on behalf of the existence of
everyone” (1990b, 137). He called this insight “biopower.”
Biopower deals with the social body and its effects in producing norms.
Foucault recognized that life gained new meaning in the classical age and again
during the advent of capitalism. The concern over life (its ordering,
maintenance, and subsistence), for Foucault, is a modern invention, and
biopower represents a positive force in the sense that it produces new meaning
to life. It assembles the forces of power and the effects of knowledge operating
on subjects. The alteration in the view of sovereignty, then, from an
institutional structure (premised on natural balances) to that which “obliges
obedience” (Foucault, 2008, 303) means that, today, it is less important to focus
on sovereignty as a political and institutional structure than as one element
among many that structures subjectivity.
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There is, for Foucault, a clear movement in history and philosophy away
from concerns over the best regime and the proper ordering of the soul to the
various and unrestricted elements that constitute the soul. For Giorgio
Agamben, similarly, but with significant differences in emphasis, the meanings
of sovereignty and of subjectivity have been irredeemably altered; Agamben
argues that the concentration camp has replaced the city as the paradigmatic
object of inquiry into sovereignty, subjectivity, and citizenship (Ek, 2006). This
alteration has as its most significant trope the Muselmann.
In the third part of our essay, we discuss not a factor in the
reconstitution of the detainee but the outcome of the two factors mentioned
above. The idea of the detainee as a Muselmann contains within it important
implications for the new understanding of sovereignty in the era of
Guantánamo, in an age of exception. In Arabic, one who submits to the will of
God is a Muslim. However, in the argot of Auschwitz (but not in all the
concentration camps of the Third Reich), the Muselmann is the one who was
“given up by his comrades … a staggering corpse, a bundle of physical
functions, in its last convulsions” (Amery, 1980, 9). In Auschwitz, the
Muselmann became a classification of a certain kind of person unworthy of life,
a product of Nazism’s peculiar ordering of rank among human beings in
confinement.
Yet rather than categorizing the Muselmann as an outlier who is brought
within the “juridico-political order” (Agamben, 1998, 18), Agamben sees the
Muselmann as the being that constitutes the political order in modern times
because that order no longer lives by the distinction between inside and outside,
between the political animal and the slave. Such distinctions have crumbled in
the presence of the Nazi concentration camps. Thus, the state of exception
which brought forth the Muselmann is neither a legal phenomenon nor a
political one, strictly understood. It is, rather, the space which validates the
juridico-political order (Agamben, 1998, 19). Sovereignty, Agamben writes, is
reconstituted here, on the threshold of the new order of the ages, and whose
symbol is the concentration camp. The camp and its effects have overturned all
moral qualities, all distinctions between human and animal, particularly with
the advent of the Muselmann, whose presence we are only beginning to
witness, but whose affect on power we cannot avoid. “It can even be said that
the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign
power” (Agamben, 1998, 6; italics in original). For Agamben, the Muselmann
reframes sovereignty at the point of convergence within the liminal spaces of
sovereignty, Guantánamo, and biopower.
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Fourth, then, we turn to the final factor in the altered status of the
detainee, bioconvergence. The Bush Administration’s legal tactics regarding
detainees took place, in part, under cover of the media’s failure to report the full
story of the war’s effects, both in battle and at Guantánamo, which allowed the
Bush Administration to implement policies that both ignored legal norms and
stretched the meaning of legal norms (Kurtz, 2004, A1; John, Domke, et al.,
2007). And yet, two years after the war began, the media’s newfound focus on
the arrests and the conditions of imprisonment of those deemed “enemy
combatants” provided the public with insight into the Bush Administration’s
thinking regarding friends and enemies. Through published pictures in major
newsweeklies, the shrouded detainees of Guantánamo have become (and
continue to be) the site of convergence for the effects of biopower on those
deemed unworthy of national and international legal protections. Thus, at the
intersection of sovereignty, the war on terror, and the media lies a convergence
of ideas and practices that fundamentally alter the meaning of being a detainee.
I. The War on Terror
On December 28, 2001, the New York Times reported that, as a result of finding
no suitable place to detain those captured in the war on terror, detainees would
be held in “the least worst place” (Seelye, 2001), Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In
January 2002, the United States, which has jurisdiction over Guantánamo
through a 1903 treaty with Cuba, opened a number of detention camps there for
the express purpose of holding those captured in the war on terror in a place the
law could not reach. The Bush Administration argued, as Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia later wrote, that Guantánamo “is outside the sovereign
‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States” (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006, 670).
By the end of January 2002, the detention camps at Guantánamo were operating
at full capacity and the military was planning to add 1,000 more prisoners
within the next few months (Seelye & Erlanger, 2002). Overall, only five
detainees have been convicted of terrorism charges. An unknown number have
been released without trial, after years of confinement. As of November 2010,
there were 174 detainees remaining (Williams, 2010).
Between the events of September 11, 2001 and the establishment of
detention camps in Cuba, Congress passed a resolution, the Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF). Section 2(a) of the AUMF grants the president
the authority to:
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
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committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons. (Authorization for the Use of Military Force, 2001)
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an executive order subjecting
non-citizens captured by U.S. armed forces to detention and trial by military
tribunals. Section 2(a) defines those subject to the order as follows:
The term “individual subject to this order” shall mean any
individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to
whom I determine from time to time in writing that:
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant
times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al
Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to
commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in
preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause,
or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects
on the United States, its citizens, national security,
foreign policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals
described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection
2(a)(1) of this order. (Military Order, 2001)
The Bush Administration characterized the events of September 11, 2001 as an
act of war by non-state actors against the United States, though “the use of
force by private persons rather than organs of a state has not traditionally
constituted an ‘act of war’” (Elsea, 2007, 14). Because of the ill-defined nature
of the “global war on terror,” that is, that it is a war and not a legal strategy to
contain terrorism, but it is a war fought against non-state actors, where the
guarantees of the Geneva Conventions are lower than for state actors, the Bush
Administration argued that: (i) those detained by U.S. armed forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan would be subject to trial by military tribunals, where the
protections of due process are lower than in civil courts; (ii) detainees would
have no right to habeas corpus; and (iii) the detainees could be subject to harsh
tactics, including torture, to elicit information, with the participation of health
officials (Physicians for Human Rights, 2010).
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By the end of 2002, those in charge of Guantánamo’s prison camps had
been given a “72-point matrix for stress and duress,” which laid out types of
coercion and the escalating levels at which they could be applied. These
included the use of harsh heat or cold; withholding food; hooding for days at a
time; naked isolation in cold, dark cells for more than 30 days, and threatening
(but not biting) by dogs. It also permitted limited use of “stress positions”
designed to subject detainees to rising levels of pain (Barry et al., 2004).
An investigation into claims of torture by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison, in
Iraq, revealed “the following acts”:
(1) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees[, and] jumping on
their naked feet; (2) Videotaping and photographing naked male
and female detainees; (3) Forcibly arranging detainees in
various sexually explicit positions for photographing; (4)
Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them
naked for several days at a time; (5) Forcing naked male
detainees to wear women’s underwear; (6) Forcing groups of
male detainees to masturbate themselves while being
photographed and videotaped; (7) Arranging naked male
detainees in a pile and then jumping on them; (8) Positioning a
naked detainee on a ... Box, with a sandbag on his head, and
attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric
torture; (9) Writing ‘I am a Rapest’ (sic) on the leg of a detainee
alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and
then photographing him naked; (10) Placing a dog chain or strap
around a naked detainee's neck and having a female Soldier
pose for a picture; (11) A male MP [military police] guard
having sex with a female detainee; (12) Using military working
dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and
in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee; and
(13) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees. (American
Journal of International Law, 2004, 594-595)
In 2004, the Bush Administration repudiated a 2002 Office of Legal
Counsel memo that had argued that the torture of detainees was legally
permissible, provided that legal distinctions were made between acts that
“constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment” and torture (Bybee, 2002,
31; Levin, 2004). Although the use of torture seems to have been more
widespread in Iraq than at Guantánamo, the prison camps at Guantánamo
remain places where torture and extreme punishment have occurred and those
in charge have not been punished (Physicians for Human Rights, 2010;
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Woodward, 2009). The Obama Administration had stated that it would close
the prisons at Guantánamo (and relocate the prisoners to Illinois), but it missed
its own deadline and later abandoned the idea that prisoners be moved to
Illinois. It has also stated that it plans to keep using military tribunals to
prosecute some detainees at Guantánamo Bay (Baker and Herszenhorn, 2009).
The issue, then, of the status of those held at Guantánamo turns, to some extent,
on the meaning of sovereignty, and has implications for understanding
biopower in the age of the concentration camp.
Legal Exceptions
In this section, we will examine two key cases that made their way to the
United States Supreme Court from Guantánamo with much difficulty. In the
first case, Salim Ahmed Hamden, who was not an American, was deemed by
the Bush Administration to be an enemy combatant and denied the right to
petition for his release. In the second case, the Bush Administration considered
Yasir Hamdi, an American, an enemy combatant and denied him his rights to
an attorney and to petition federal courts. The question in both cases is whether
those captured in the war on terror have the right to petition federal courts for
relief. But the answers are not simple. Traditionally, non-state enemy
combatants, particularly non-American non-state enemy combatants, have not
been accorded the full panoply of rights guaranteed by both the U.S.
Constitution and the Geneva Conventions. Americans who engage in war
against the United States are also in a gray zone of legal protections.
During the invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. armed forces captured Salim
Ahmed Hamdan, a citizen of Yemen and a chauffeur for Osama bin Laden. In
June 2002, Hamdan was transferred to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and
subsequently charged with one count of conspiracy to commit terrorism.
President Bush, acting under an order his office issued on November 13, 2001,
declared Hamdan suitable for trial by military commission, despite Hamdan’s
claim that he was a civilian, not an armed soldier in the war between the United
States and Afghanistan (Johnson v. Eisentrager, 1950, 765; Goodman, 2009). A
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) declared Hamdan to be an enemy
combatant. Hamdan then filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.
In state and federal criminal cases, a writ is applied for after conviction,
to contest the legal grounds used to convict. If granted, the prisoner is either set
free or retried according to a different set of legal criteria. Hamdan, however,
applied for habeas corpus before the military tribunal convened, citing a

www.mediatropes.com

MediaTropes Vol III, No 1 (2011)

Cary Federman & Dave Holmes / 65

“substantial” claim that the commission lacked jurisdiction to try him. The
district court ruled in Hamdan’s favor, on the ground that the government first
had to prove that Hamdan was a prisoner of war before trying him by military
commission. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court ruled on a
number of important legal issues, but for our purposes it is notable that the
appellate court held that the Geneva Convention, as a treaty among nations,
does not confer rights or remedies on individuals (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2005,
38-39). The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s ruling (Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 2006).
No straight line runs from Hamdan’s arrest in Afghanistan to his
petition for habeas corpus from a cell at Guantánamo, Cuba, to a court in
Washington, D.C. While Hamdan was at Guantánamo, Congress passed the
Detainee Treatment Act. “Under the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, detainees
may appeal decisions of the military tribunals to the District of Columbia
Circuit, but only under circumscribed procedures, which include a presumption
that the evidence before the military tribunal was accurate and complete”
(Stout, 2008). The government’s position regarding Hamdan’s claim was that
the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review the appellate court’s ruling. In
other words, Hamdan and other non-American detainees at Guantánamo have
no right to petition American federal courts for habeas corpus relief from
unlawful imprisonment because that right is reserved for Americans. The
government also argued that Congress has the power to curtail the Supreme
Court’s habeas jurisdiction, though this is a point of dubious legality. The
government argued that it was free to hold Hamdan and all non-American
detainees at Guantánamo until the cessation of the war on terrorism or until a
court finds that the detainees are no longer a threat to American security
interests (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006, 671; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004, 510511). In an amicus curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court on behalf of
Hamdan, 304 British and European parliamentarians wrote that to deny
detainees the right to contest their confinement in American courts would thrust
them into a “shadow world where neither the Constitution nor the Laws of the
United States nor the rules of international law … afford any appropriate
protection whatsoever” (Amicus Brief, 2006, 5).
Taking seriously the claim that Guantánamo could be considered “a
geographic area in which certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as embodying
fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended”
(Neumann, 1996, 1201), Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for
the majority in Hamdan, said that military tribunals are “neither mentioned in
the Constitution nor created by statute.” They were “born of military necessity”
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(Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006, 590), and have been used in every American war,
including the American Revolution (Fisher, 2004). For Stevens, however, the
context of the creation and use of military tribunals during war or war-like
conflicts, rather than providing the Bush Administration with grounds to
continue using military tribunals, created, rather, a reason to scrutinize the use
of military tribunals for those detained at Guantánamo, particularly as the
president claimed to have the power to create them as part of his constitutional
powers during an emergency. Two important questions flow from Justice
Stevens’ opinion: Must military—not civil—courts try Hamdan out of a
perceived necessity that Hamdan posed a national security risk? If so, what
emergency has prevented Hamdan from obtaining relief in a civil court?
(Relyea, 2001; Relyea, 2006).
The government argued, first, that Hamdan would be tried by a legally
constituted military tribunal, complete with the possibility of making a defense,
and in the event of failure, with the possibility of appeal. Second, the
government argued that Hamdan had no claims as a prisoner of war under the
Third Geneva Convention (Avalon Project, 1969). He was an enemy
combatant, subject to military law. Although all signatories to the Convention
are bound by its terms to respect prisoners of war, “there is no suggestion of
judicial enforcement” outside the parameters established by American law, the
government argued (Hamdan v. Rumseld, 2005, 40). Hamdan, in this view, is
subject to “humane treatment” and the “judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized people” (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2005,
41). But no more.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Bush Administration’s
arguments. Apart from the procedural weaknesses that favor the prosecution’s
narrative over the defendant’s—for example, statements made under duress or
coercion can be admitted, witnesses need not be sworn, and guilt can be
determined by a two-thirds vote—the Court made a number of important
statements regarding the establishment of military tribunals. Although the
Supreme Court declined to answer the question whether the president has the
sole authority to establish military tribunals based on inherent powers bestowed
on him by the Constitution and by the exigencies of war (Ex parte Quirin, 1947,
28), the Court was reluctant to accept the argument that the president can create
“‘military commissions when he deems them necessary’” (Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 2006, 593). The idea that Congress, not the president, has the power
to create military tribunals, Justice Stevens argued, has not been repealed by the
executive orders and laws passed in the wake of September 11. Nor have the
laws of war, to which the United States is a signatory, been repealed. Moreover,
Congress never declared a state of emergency. Civil courts remained open
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following the events of September 11, 2001. Regarding adhering to and
implementing the Geneva Conventions, Justice Stevens rejected the court of
appeals’ opinion that “the war with al Qaeda evades the reach of the Geneva
Conventions” (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006, 628).
Although the Supreme Court ruled against the Bush Administration
regarding Hamden’s status as a detainee with rights against his captors, the
Bush Administration did not stray too far from a reasonable interpretation of
how to treat non-Americans captured in a theater of war. The more difficult
case is figuring out what rights Americans have when captured by U.S. forces
in a theater of war, where the assumption is that the American had joined an
enemy of the United States and had taken up arms against it.
Yaser Hamdi was born in Louisiana to two Saudi subjects. At the time
of his capture in Afghanistan, he was an American citizen. He no longer is; he
has been stripped of his citizenship and dispatched to Saudi Arabia. He was
transferred to Guantánamo and, when it was discovered that he held an
American passport, to a military brig in South Carolina. He was then held in
solitary confinement for two years, never charged with a crime. He had little
contact with lawyers and no military tribunal has ever determined his legal
status. But because he was a fighter for the Taliban, he was designated as an
enemy combatant.
The Department of Defense argued that American citizens who are
considered to be enemy combatants could have access to an attorney, provided
that “such access will not compromise national security” (Respondent’s brief,
2004, 8). The government, moreover, argued that during times of war, “the
President, as Commander in Chief, has the authority to capture and detain
enemy combatants” (Respondent’s brief, 2004, 9). The problem with this
argument is the following: if the war on terror is endless, what use are the other
institutions of government in the war on terror? Has the war on terror turned the
United States into a presidential dictatorship? Has the exception overcome the
rule? According to the Constitution, if the president wants to hold American
citizens indefinitely during wartime, the remedy is simple: have Congress
suspend the writ of habeas corpus by declaring, in accordance with Article I,
section 9, clause 2—which grants (somewhat ambiguously) the authority to
Congress to suspend the writ during times of rebellion—that the United States
is under a state of emergency.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
ordered Hamdi released but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed this order, arguing that, as Hamdi was captured in a zone of
conflict—which offered him only minimal legal protections, according to both
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U.S. and international law—the district court needed to defer to the president’s
war powers regarding detaining enemy combatants. The Supreme Court,
however, was confident that the United States was not undergoing a rebellion,
and therefore held that Hamdi was entitled to all the constitutional protections
given to any American citizen. Although there was no clear majority on the
Supreme Court for the position announced either by the district court or the
court of appeals, eight justices agreed that the president does not have the sole
authority to hold American citizens indefinitely without due process of law.
Going even further than the majority, Justices Scalia and Stevens argued that:
Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against
it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in
federal court for treason or some other crime. Where the
exigencies of war prevent that, the Constitution’s Suspension
Clause, Art. I, §9, cl. 2, allows Congress to relax the usual
protections temporarily. Absent suspension, however, the
Executive’s assertion of military exigency has not been thought
sufficient to permit detention without charge. No one contends
that the congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force,
on which the Government relies to justify its actions here, is an
implementation of the Suspension Clause [i.e., the clause that
allows Congress to suspend habeas corpus during times of
rebellion]. (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004, 554)
In the eighteenth century, Britain created two “exempt jurisdictions” in
which habeas corpus relief could not be obtained: the Channel Islands and
India. Persons sent to those places could be detained indefinitely with no right
to petition a judge for relief (Boumediene v. Bush, 2008, 2249). Is this the Bush
Administration’s model, putting prisoners on an island off the coast of the
United States, that the United States controls but does not possess, and making
that island-prison a place where prisoners have no legal claims against their
captors? (Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 2004, 465). In fact, the connection between the
exempt jurisdictions of the British Empire and Guantánamo is thin, and also
largely irrelevant. The British maintained some degree of control over their
imperial possessions and courts were open but unavailable for certain detainees.
By contrast, there are no federal courts at Guantánamo and the de facto captor
is the Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States, who can only
be reached by writs of habeas corpus filed in federal courts on the mainland of
the United States. More important, as the Supreme Court stressed in
Boumediene, “given the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and the particular
dangers of terrorism in the modern age, the [British] common-law courts
simply may not have confronted cases with close parallels to this one”
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(Boumediene v. Bush, 2008, 2251). Although Cuba has ultimate jurisdiction
over the island, the United States has effective jurisdiction over Guantánamo
Bay. Therefore, it could be argued that Cuba has de jure sovereignty over
Guantánamo, because it is part of Cuba, but the United States exercises
“practical sovereignty” over Guantánamo because it has “maintained complete
and uninterrupted control” over the bay for 100 years (Boumediene v. Bush,
2008, 2258).
To be sure, Guantánamo is not the legal void it once was (Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 1992). “Guantanamo Bay is in every practical
respect a United States territory” (Rasul v. Bush, 2004, 487). It is a place where
the United States holds those (including civilians) it classifies as enemy
combatants, whose rights are ranked lower than prisoners of war. And because
of that juridical designation, the government has argued that those detained at
Guantánamo have no rights against the United States, in part because of the
government’s view that Guantánamo is outside the United States’ territorial
jurisdiction, but also because those detained there are not state actors with
definable rights under U.S. and international law (United Nations, 2006, 12).
It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to examine the rights of
those detained at Guantánamo. Rather, we seek to situate the detainees within
the broader discursive field that relegates them to a lower status than prisoners
of war because of the state of exception that they inhabit. Following the events
of September 11, President Bush characterized the war on terror as a war that
demands the full strength and power of the national security apparatus. This
would be a war like no other the United States has engaged in:
I know that some people question if America is really in a war at
all. They view terrorism more as a crime—a problem to be
solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments. After the
World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the
guilty were indicted, tried, convicted, and sent to prison. But the
matter was not settled. The terrorists were still training and
plotting in other nations, and drawing up more ambitious plans.
After the chaos and carnage of September 11th, it is not enough
to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their
supporters declared war on the United States—and war is what
they got. (Bush, 2004)
In a situation governed by a war mentality rather than by the formalities of
criminal justice, where the protections of due process are higher, the Bush
Administration abandoned concerns for abiding by established judicial norms
regarding prisoners of war (Mayer, 2007). Attorney General Gonzales argued
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that “this new paradigm [the global war on terror] renders obsolete Geneva’s
strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of
its provisions” (Barry et al., 2004, 3). In this new configuration, Guantánamo is
the rule by which the exception is defined. And because the status of the
Guantánamo detainees signifies more than a legal void, in the next two
sections, we turn to three key thinkers on the question of sovereignty, biopower,
and the state of exception (Foucault, Agamben, and Carl Schmitt), to discuss
the contested meaning of sovereignty and the implications for understanding
the role of the excluded in an age of exception.
II. Sovereignty
Friends and Enemies
The German legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, is regarded as the first thinker to
characterize modern society by the distinction “friend” and “enemy.” “War is
the existential negation of the enemy” (Schmitt, 1996, 33, 26). Friends and
enemies are to be “understood in their concrete and existential sense” (Schmitt,
1996, 27). Schmitt speaks of the “real possibility of physical killing” in the
contest between friends and enemies (Schmitt, 1996, 33). He does so because
the enemy is more important, existentially, than the friend. And this is so
because for Schmitt, unlike for Thomas Hobbes, the state of war takes place not
among individuals, but “of groups, and especially of nations” (Schmitt, 1996, 8,
n. 14). Schmitt thus elevates the political existence of the state and of society
above other forms of organization within the state and society. He attacks
liberalism in the name of that to which it is most opposed: the centralization of
power for the purpose of exposing the contradictions of the rule of law for
governance. The enemy, and not an abstract pursuit of happiness, provides the
state and its inhabitants with meaning. The exception—the suspension of the
norm—is the ground upon which the political is restored. Thus, the political is
not the equivalent of the “moral, aesthetic, and economic” ways of constituting
the state. The political rests “on its own ultimate distinctions” (Schmitt, 1996,
26).
Because Schmitt invests the sovereign with the power to decide who are
the friends and enemies of the state, the sovereign has the power to decide who
lives and who dies. Schmitt sees the sovereign not as a judge, a legislator, or an
executive. The sovereign is not a dictator. The sovereign stands outside of these
categories even as it is invested in making decisions that involve legislative,
executive, and judicial domains. The sovereign makes these decisions and
distinctions but is not part of these decisions and distinctions. The sovereign
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stands outside of law and yet is part of law. The peculiar position the sovereign
has in regard to the law grants the sovereign a monopoly over decision making.
The sovereign determines the qualities of the emergency, the limits of the crisis,
and the state of exception. “Sovereign is he who decides the exception”
(Schmitt, 2005, 5). The exception, the suspension of law in its crudest sense,
creates the space for the sovereign to act against those who are not its friends.
“The sovereign decides not the licit and illicit but the originary inclusion of the
living in the sphere of law” (Agamben, 1998, 26).
Schmitt’s contention is that the modern state refuses to acknowledge the
importance of violence to governance because it desires a peace established out
of the fractured parts of a whole working antagonistically yet peacefully to
achieve temporary power. This is untenable for Schmitt. In this view, modern
liberalism transforms the enemy into a competitor for power; sovereignty is
reduced to jurisdiction. Power means the separation of powers. The mantra of
American separation of powers theory—“The government of the United States
is supreme within its sphere of action” (Dobbins v. Comm’rs of Erie County,
1842, 447)—encapsulates the essence of modern liberalism’s desiccated
understanding of power. To further divide sovereignty in the name of freedom,
liberalism makes a distinction between normal and emergency powers (Lobel,
1989).
Attacking liberalism over these core issues, the true threat to peace,
Schmitt writes, is not the economic competitor or the smaller jurisdiction. The
enemy does not follow the logic of economic rationality or the constraints
imposed by modern liberalism (Hobbes, 1962, part II, ch. 28). Because Schmitt
sees the challenge to sovereignty as an existential and ontological threat, the
outsider is not to be accorded any place outside the regime, as an effect of
power, a remainder, which is how the law regards enemy combatants. To view
the outsider this way is to downgrade the importance and the centrality of the
enemy’s place in constituting the political. The outsider is not outside the
political, “morally evil or aesthetically ugly.” The threat is moral, but not
abstractly moral. The friend/enemy distinction is “specifically political”
(Schmitt, 1996, 26). The enemy must be “the other, the stranger” (Schmitt,
1996, 27). The enemy is determined by the “mode of behavior” that clearly
evaluates “the situation” and correctly distinguishes the friend from the enemy
(Schmitt, 1996, 37). The enemy “is solely the public enemy” (Schmitt, 1996,
28). For this reason, the sovereign keeps its gaze on the “dire emergency”
(Schmitt, 1996 105). The sovereign is free to create a state of exception in the
presence of the enemy.
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Schmitt empties modern political life of the vestiges of classic European
rationality (Weber, 1958). The “glamorization of violence” (Scheuerman, 1997,
20) in Schmitt’s work leads to the abandonment of any ethic of responsibility
on behalf of the state or state actors toward those previously deemed outlaws of
“humanity” but now considered as enemies (Schmitt, 1996, 79). The violation
of legal norms can now be discussed openly (Harris, 2005). Consequently, the
resolution of the friend/enemy distinction is not a question of jurisdiction or of
political competition. The question of friends and enemies cannot be resolved
by discussion between parties or among those with shared convictions or those
with conflicting interests in the governance of the state (Schmitt, 1988). Rather,
the sovereign must make decisions; “the decision is the event through which the
subject constitutes itself” (Papacharlambous, 2010, 57). The decision to act is
best done in a moment of crisis for the state, when it confronts the enemy.
“There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos” (Schmitt, 2005, 13).
Agamben asks, regarding Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction: what is
the structure of sovereignty that it “consists in nothing other than the
suspension of the rule?” (Agamben, 1998, 17). For Agamben, the state of
exception is not a state of chaos. The state of exception is the “situation that
results” from the suspension of the rules (Agamben, 1998, 18). What defines
chaos is not excess but its existence within a state. With the suspension of the
law, the “juridical order’s validity” (Agamben, 1998, 18) is suspended,
withdrawn, and abandoned; the outside and the inside collapse on each other.
The sovereign has now created and defined “the very space in which the
juridico-political order can have validity” (Agamben, 1998, 29). But the
validity of the juridical order is, at the same time, ambiguous. What is outside
and what is inside now exist in a “zone of indistinction” (Agamben, 1998, 19).
Under these conditions, the state of exception moves to the forefront of politics,
redefining norms along the way. And in this process of redefinition, the
meaning of life for Agamben is clarified: the status of the enemy is one of bare
life.
The state of exception “implicated bare life within it” (Agamben, 1998,
83). What is bare life? Agamben writes that in Roman law, homo sacer is the
one who is both sacred and damned. Homo sacer can be killed but not
sacrificed.
The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to
kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a
sacrifice, and sacred life—that is, life that may be killed but
not sacrificed—is the life that has been captured in its sphere.
(Agamben, 1998, 83; italics in original)
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In a world bereft of nature, history, and a deity as a ground for ethics, life loses
its meaning as a thing-in-itself. The sovereign is the “guarantor” of the situation
of life (Schmitt, 2005, 13). But what does Schmitt mean by life? Agamben
locates two meanings for life in modernity. “The Greeks had no single term to
express what we mean by the word ‘life’” (Agamben, 1998, 1). They used two
distinct terms for life: zoe, “which expressed the simple fact of living common
to all living beings,” and bios, “which indicated the form or way of living
proper to an individual or a group” (Agamben, 1998, 1).
For Agamben, the central image (and producer) of life during a time
shrouded in the friend/enemy distinction is the concentration camp. The camp
is a “no man’s land between coma and death” (Agamben, 1998, 161). The camp
comes into existence as a political concept when the state of exception is
normalized. The camp is not a temporary camp, a displacement camp for
refugees on their way to someplace else, but a permanent feature of the modern
world, modern politics, and of modern thought (Agamben, 1998, 174). It is a
place to house the zoes of the world (Agamben notes that in Greek, zoe has no
plural; 1998, 1). Because it houses the exceptional, it is a space of exception.
When Heinrich Himmler created “a concentration camp for political prisoners,”
Agamben writes, he placed it “outside the rules of penal and prison law”
(Agamben, 1998, 169). With the construction of prison camps in Guantánamo
as places outside the law, the exception once again becomes the norm.
Because the exception has taken over for the norm such that the two are
“indistinguishable” (Agamben, 1998, 170), the camp is the realization of the
normality of the exception. Guantánamo as a liminal space is the natural place
for those held captive in the war on terror because those it holds “do not value
life.” The inhabitants of the camp are those who have been denationalized,
stripped of their “political status,” and “deprived of their rights and
prerogatives” (Agamben, 1998, 171) to such an extent that any harm committed
against them no longer appears as a crime (Bybee, 2002; Savage, 2010;
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child). The
inhabitants of the camps are zoe as such. They are the remnants of the active
life, made bare by their status as enemies of the sovereign. For Agamben, the
creation of the friend/enemy distinction no longer relies on law (if it ever did).
Rather, following Foucault, Agamben posits the creation of the zoe as an aspect
of the onset of biopolitics. Biopolitics is the result of a certain “art of
government” (Foucault, 2008, 2) that arose at a particular time in western
history and thought as an effort to “rationalize the problems posed to
governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings
forming a population” (Foucault, 2008, 317). Biopolitics has no sovereign will
driving its application; there is no Being behind it. Rather, it is an application of
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rationalities and consequently, for Foucault, it has a contingent quality to it. For
Agamben, however, it is a strategy for governance amid the presence of the
enemy. Agamben actualizes the homo sacer because the homo sacer is
“exemplary of biopolitics” (Ansah, 2010, 147).
The Suspension of the Norm
Like the first Iraq war—which Jean Baudrillard famously argued did not “take
place” (Baudrillard, 1995), by which he meant that the war was a media (and
mediated) event—the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to be seen
from a distance (Stolberg, 2004; Rhee, 2009). But these wars differ from the
first Gulf war in that they are being fought between the army of a state and
those who are seemingly stateless. More important, the second war in Iraq has
revealed a problem—the management of prisoners—that is more than merely
“organizational-technical” in nature (Schmitt, 2005, 65). To be sure, the
prisoner problem is both old and new. It is old in the sense that all wars create
prisoners and refugees and their concomitant administrative problems: where to
put them, how long to hold them, and how to treat them, etc. (Arendt, 1994;
Arendt, 1958, chap. 9).
What is new is that the Bush Administration intentionally placed
prisoners captured in the war on terror in a “law-free zone, a place where the
government could do whatever it wanted without having to worry about
whether it was legal” (American Civil Liberties Union, 2008). The war on
terror, then, has produced a different set of strategies for the containment of
prisoners of war and enemy combatants than previous modern wars because it
has removed prisoners of war and enemy combatants from the protections
afforded by both the U.S. Constitution and by international treaties. It has
reframed the conflict over prisoners as an existential struggle between friends
and enemies. It has brought back the concept of executive decisionism and
exposed the weaknesses of liberal thought on the rule of law (Schmitt, 1996,
35, 37), because the creation of a penal colony that exists in a gray zone of
legality does more than highlight an administrative problem for the war on
terror. The emergency created by the war on terror presents itself as the central
meaning of the war because it turns a common administrative problem of war
into the prime ethical problem that plagues modern thought: the management of
bodies according to the valuation of their worth. It is in this sense that
Guantánamo has reframed the identity and the status of the prisoners held there,
legally and ontologically, by removing any stake they might once have had in a
“qualified life” (Agamben, 1998, 1), that is, in a life beyond mere existence.
Guantánamo has reduced its inmates to life as such, forcing these bodies to
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exist at a point of convergence among biopolitical, bioethical, and biocultural
realms.
For Agamben, the connection between life and sovereignty occurred not
in the classical age, which Foucault understands as the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, but in classical Greece and Rome. Agamben differs from
Foucault in this respect, and the implications for their different understandings
of sovereignty lie here. Because Agamben is not as reluctant as Foucault to
approach a unifying theory, he writes that there is a “point at which the
voluntary servitude of individuals comes into contact with absolute power”
(Agamben, 1998, 6). Within a “zone of indistinction,” the norm and the
exception collapse, and the emergence of biopower in history represents the
true meaning of sovereignty because it connects the concern for life with the
forces of power. Agamben then locates the origins of that concern in classical
Greece. In this sense, Agamben’s ontology contains a critique of the concept of
the political, but one that goes beyond Schmitt’s understanding of the
limitations and possibilities of the political as such. The zoe, for Agamben,
functions as a paradigm which he uses to explicate the meaning of sovereignty
and subjectivity in the age of the camp. Biopolitics “fulfills the potential of its
origin in turning against that origin” (Norris, 2000, 39). The emergence of the
zoe, of the man who can be killed at will—the homo sacer—in the Nazi camps,
as well as in all other places of confinement, is Agamben’s basis for his
argument that “bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion
founds the city of men” (Agamben, 1998, 7).
What, then, is Guantánamo’s place in the structure of Agamben’s
thought? Guantánamo is not only a biopolitical space but also a place of anomie
because, though the law has been suspended (the detainees have no legal
classification outside of being enemy combatants, which means, despite some
success in the Supreme Court, they can remain in confinement for the duration
of the war on terror), it still exists as a reality (the rule of law is upheld in the
absence of a law governing enemy combatants). What Guantánamo has created,
in this view, is a peculiar hybrid: an institution of restriction and an entity that
decides who lives, who is known, and who disappears (Meek, 2003).
Guantánamo appears as the rupture in modern thought between the norm and
the exception. Its appearance highlights the collapsed distinction between
nature and law, and therefore represents the normality of the “state of exception
as a permanent structure of juridico-political de-localization and dis-location”
(Agamben, 1998, 38). As the state of nature always exists within the state of
civil society, the state of exception exists within the norm.
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To be sure, outside the camps, the prisoners exist as (not yet) legal
entities pressing claims in American courts against their captors. But this
situation only reduces them to life “purely insofar as it is political” (Rose, 1996,
26). In Agamben’s words, life and law (bios and nomos) become indiscernible
in the state of exception, creating “a juridical rule that decides the fact that
decides on its application” (Agamben, 1998, 171; italics in original). Law no
longer has the force of law, insofar as law is no longer regarded as a set of
institutions that act on the command of the sovereign. This is not lawlessness or
anarchy. The law is being governed by a biological impetus that expresses the
fragility of life and uncertainty of the modern condition. Speaking not of
internment camps as such but of places that become places of internment,
Agamben writes, “the normal order is de facto suspended,” and the
determination of atrocities turns not on law “but on the civility and ethical sense
of the police who temporarily act as sovereign” (Agamben, 1998, 174).
Whereas Foucault viewed the Nazi state and its camps as a “paroxysmal
space in which sovereign power and biopolitics coincided” (Gregory, 2006,
406), Agamben views the camp itself, whether as an extermination camp or a
detention center, as the “sign of the system’s inability to function without being
transformed into a lethal machine” (Agamben, 1998, 175). Agamben
reinterprets Foucauldian biopolitical sovereignty by collapsing any distinction
Foucault made (or implied) between sovereignty and biopower, ancient and
modern power. Agamben seeks to correct or complete the Foucauldian analysis
of biopower and sovereignty by placing the camp within the concept of man’s
being-in-the-world, and not by demarcating it as an extension of modern
thought (Agamben, 1998, 9). “The politicization of bare life as such,” Agamben
writes, “constitutes the decisive event of modernity and signals a radical
transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical thought”
(Agamben, 1998, 4). This “transformation,” Andrew Norris writes, “is made
possible by the very metaphysics of those very ancient categories” (Norris,
2000, 39). In other words, Agamben, unlike Foucault, sees the concern with the
ordering of life to be without disjunction.
For Foucault, the rise of biopower is connected to the rise of the natural
and social sciences in the nineteenth century. He saw an intensification of
power over life during this period. But Agamben is in search of the “point of
intersection” “at which techniques of individualization and totalizing
procedures converge” (Agamben, 1998, 6). And once the paradigm is isolated
in the camp and through the Muselmann, he can then connect the idea of the
power over life and death from Aristotle to Auschwitz and through to
Guantánamo. What Agamben sees in Guantánamo is biology, law, and
humanity subjected to a relentless logic of exclusion, classification, and fear
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that determine the outcome of events. The detainees are thus understood to
“reside in the liminal, in-between spaces that survive at the borders and
frontiers of the social order” (Nishime, 2005, 34). The Guantánamo detainees
are the twenty-first century’s Muselmann.
III. The Muselmann
Fleur Johns has argued that by anchoring Guantánamo securely within the
American jurisdictional orbit, the Supreme Court has not imbibed “the language
of Schmittian exceptionalism. Rather, it is suggestive of efforts to construct a
series of normatively airtight spaces in which the prospect of agonizing over an
impossible decision may be delimited, and where possible, avoided” (Johns,
2005, 631). In other words, the Supreme Court has responded to the Bush
Administration’s argument for the inherent powers of the president during war
time by forcing the executive branch into a legal battle, thereby denying any
claims to a suspension of the norm (Johns, 2005, 614). The policies of the Bush
Administration may have been done without regard for international law, but
the law has not been overtaken.
To be sure, following the events of September 11, 2001, the
Constitution was not suspended (though habeas corpus effectively was, for nonAmericans, and some Americans, such as Jose Padilla, were held without
charges and transferred between prisons without notice), courts were open, and
those outside the orbit of American law were brought within it (though some
remain at Guantánamo, in a legal limbo, while others have been sent home,
mentally impaired from what they endured) (Cratty, 2008). While this view has
a lot to recommend, there is another way to look at Guantánamo, using the
insights of Agamben.
Whereas for Aristotle, the polis determined the line between zoe and
bios, for Agamben, the Muselmann is the reconfigured sign of the times, the
limit-figure of late modern thought. In other words, the dominant figure in
modernity can no longer be the politically active man or the man of
contemplation, but the one who is subject to disciplinary institutions and
discourses that affect his being, whose life is solely determined by the act of the
sovereign. With the Muselmann, action loses “its somatic prerequisites”
(Sofsky, 1997, 201). In Auschwitz, action is not willed action, it is only
reaction, and man is reduced to mere existence. The sacredness of life has no
metaphysical content and no desired end. Rather, “Life is sacred only insofar as
it is taken into the sovereign exception” (Agamben, 1998, 85).
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Agamben sees a connection between the “structure of sovereignty and
the structure of sacratio” (Agamben, 1998, 83) that “illuminates” the
significance of homo sacer in modern thought. The affirmation of life is not
because life is sacred of itself; rather, life gains meaning by being premised on
the negation of the other. It has long been thought that every act of sovereignty
requires the “concealment of impurities” (Connolly, 1995, 138). It is no longer
possible to do so. With the presence of the Muselmann in the camp, Agamben
turns upside down Aristotle’s elevation of the zoon politikon as a creature who
leads his life according to reason.
Rather than accepting the idea that a clear line demarcates the state of
nature from civil society (or reason from unreason), Agamben demonstrates
how the existence of zoe presupposes the existence of a bios. “Bare life is a
necessary part of the good life, in that the good life is what bare life is not and
what bare life becomes” (Norris, 2000, 41). Once the traditional understanding
of reason as that-which-is-not-unreason has been overturned, Agamben can
then destroy the image of the best regime as an ahistorical trope, because the
city no longer plays the defining role in structuring subjectivity. Along with this
destruction, law too will lose its privileged place. The logic of sovereignty can
no longer reside in the fictive creation of the best city whose likeness is
reflected in the best man and remains so for all time, but in the negation of life.
Death is “not an exceptional event in the camp” (Sofsky, 1997, 204).
The immiseration of the Muselmänner in Auschwitz (and perforce in
any carceral sphere) represents a concomitant “destruction of the social sphere”
(Sofsky, 1997, 200). Agamben provides us with a picture of the destruction of
the city and of man’s degraded place in the city by the intensification of
biopower on emerging subjects. His archaeological method reveals that the
debased condition of the Muselmann has replaced as the limit-figure of thought
Freud’s neurotic, Plato’s philosopher-king, and Aristotle’s zoon politikon. This
is, Agamben writes, “a catastrophe” (Agamben, 2005, 56), which is why, in
truth, “no one wants to see the Muselmann” (Agamben, 1999, 50). But it is a
catastrophe that must be seen and understood, even if our understanding is
circumscribed by our status as non-prisoners; we, being neither Muselmänner
nor survivors, can only believe or disbelieve the witness (Lyotard, 1988, 4243). The witness, therefore, occupies a privileged place in bringing into the
light the meaning of the Muselmann. The camp survivor, however, is not the
best witness, for he or she has not endured the full effect of biopower. It is the
Muselmann who is the “complete witness” (Agamben, 1999, 165) because he
has seen “the Gorgon” and has been rendered “mute” by the experience (Levi,
1989, 83-84). For Primo Levi, as for Agamben, it is the Muselmann who is the
“complete witness,” for he is the “rule, we [survivors] are the exception” (Levi,
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1989, 84). The Muselmann has been rendered visible by the forces that
constitute sovereignty and subjectivity.
Their life is short, but their number is endless; they, the
Muselmänner, the drowned, form the backbone of the camp,
an anonymous mass, continually renewed and always
identical, of non-men who march and labour in silence, the
divine spark dead within them, already too empty to really
suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call
their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as
they are too tired to understand. (Levi, 1996, 90)
Not man as a social animal, nor man as a neurotic, nor law in its
majesty, but the power over life and death pervades the idea of sovereignty. For
Agamben, the Muselmann occupies the critical juncture in the development of
the modern state. The forces operating on and against persons are no longer as
they were in the eighteenth century, as Foucault has shown, “addressed to
bodies,” but are now directed to “man-as-species” (Foucault, 2003, 242). For
Agamben, this is more than a development of a new technology of surveillance.
The existence of the Muselmann “inaugurates a new juridico-political paradigm
in which the norm becomes indistinguishable from the exception” (Agamben,
1998, 170). The inhabitants of the camps are “denationalized” (Agamben, 1998,
171) denizens, whose lives are determined by the exigency of the situation. Not
law, but the “extreme situation” (Agamben, 1999, 55) of the war against
enemies determines the norm.
To be sure, the inmates of Guantánamo are not in the same situation as
the inmates of the Third Reich (Agamben, 2005, 4). For the most part, the
former have been captured on the battlefield and are not slated for death in gas
chambers or forced marches. Many have been released. As the Supreme Court
has made clear, detainees have rights against their captors. But the
understanding of the meaning of Guantánamo cannot be restricted to the
empirical or the literal. Nor can it be limited to what the law has allowed and
restricted. Following Agamben, Guantánamo must be understood in its
“coherent biopolitical meaning” (Agamben, 1998, 131). What this means is that
the elaboration of power over those deemed unworthy of life must be
understood as an unfolding of power that reveals itself with the “anatomopolitics of the human body” and the “regulatory controls” of a “biopolitics of
the population” (Foucault, 1990b, 139; italics in original).
The long view regarding the evolution of Guantánamo as a species of
biopower that has roots in the classical distinction between zoe, or bare life, and
bios, a life within a political community, seems to us more appropriate than an
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alternative view that sees Guantánamo as a site of power and resistance that
tugs at, but does not question, the concept of the political. “The ‘body’ is
always already caught in a deployment of power,” Agamben argues (1998,
187), and it is necessary to see how that deployment of power has turned into
the concept of sovereignty where the Muselmann, and not the political animal,
is the focal point. Indeed, to understand Agamben’s point, it is important to set
Guantánamo within the context of the capillary nature of power, that is, by
investigating the practice of power relations on and within the “social body”
(Foucault, 1990a, 118). To concentrate on the detainees’ success in chipping
away at the Bush Administration’s restrictive approach to legal remedies for
detainees is to continue to operate within the “juridico-political discourse”
(Foucault, 1990b, 88) that established Guantánamo in the first place. Power
must be examined as something that is “always already there”; we must
recognize that one is “never ‘outside’” power (Foucault, 1980, 141), a view not
normally associated with legal liberalism.
It is, at the same time, important to recognize Guantánamo as one link in
a biopolitical chain that has brought to light the effects of biopower on
sovereignty. A more detailed exposition of this thought would have to include
Agamben’s discussion, at the end of Homo Sacer, of the politicization of death
in the field of health care ethics (Agamben, 1998, 160-165). But here let it
suffice to say that the detainees’ debased moral standing, for Agamben, cannot
be the result of a failed effort to establish the proper forum necessary for trying
those held outside the territory of the United States. Rather, the Muselmänner
are “the site of an experiment in which morality and humanity themselves are
called into question” (Agamben, 1999, 63). As they move in an “absolute
indistinction of fact and law” (Agamben, 1998, 185), Agamben understands
their presence neither as an effect of war nor as a representation of a rupture in
law, but in ontological terms, because the state of war or of exception has
become the norm by which subjectivity is formed and reformed. In this very
real sense, the camp has replaced the city as the paradigmatic structure of
modern times that informs subjectivity.
Guantánamo is the outcome of a rationality that accelerated in the late
nineteenth century, but whose origin can be traced back to antiquity. Both the
attempt to restore the polis for romantic or antiquarian reasons, or the need to
define the modern by contrasting it with the polis, represent examples of critical
thought, but not the thought that is necessary to rethink ontological questions
that inform the concept of the political, now that this concept is understood in
biopolitical terms. For Agamben, we “no longer know anything of the classical
distinction between zoe and bios, between private life and political existence,
between man as a simple living being at home in the house and man’s political
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existence in the city” (Agamben, 1998, 187). Because the break with the
ancients is premised on their own terms over the meaning of life, Agamben’s
archaeology of knowledge and genealogy of ethics reveal that there “is no
return from the camps to classical politics” (Agamben, 1998, 187). The
sovereignty of law is over. For Agamben, the core meaning of biopower is that
it has forced an abandonment of the “juridical model of sovereignty” (Foucault,
2003, 265) and the political structure of the best regime. For this reason,
Agamben argues that the bestowal of rights on the zoe is not, in itself, a
negation of his argument that Guantánamo represents an anomic space. The zoe
is not without rights. Once politicized, the zoe passes through the “boundaries
separating life from death in order to identify a new living dead man, a new
sacred man” (Agamben, 1998, 131).
IV. Bioconvergence
The popular image of Guantánamo detainees is of shackled, hooded men in
orange jump suits, surrounded by barbed wire. The “space of the camp,”
Agamben writes, washes up “against a central non-place, where the Muselmann
lives” (Agamben, 1999, 51-52; italics in original). The camp is the place for
bioconvergence, an intersection of image, biopower, and the law. For many
Americans, these images have defined what it means to be Muslim (Sengupta
and Masood, 2005). The images of Guantánamo have created, on a global scale,
the meaning of the camp as a place of biopolitical convergence.
The homo sacer is the site upon which “sovereign power is founded”
(Agamben, 1998, 142). The sovereign authority that governs Guantánamo has
the power over life and death, the power to decide who shall become a zoe and
who a bios. It is not a lawless entity, but a law-giving entity, even as it has
suspended the law’s power. The force of law remains in effect “as the power
that informs life from the beginning in all its extension, constitution, and
intensity” (Esposito, 2008, 81). But other forces can be discerned that have
produced counter-narratives. By creating an archive of the lost voices from the
war on terror, the press and international organizations have revealed that
Guantánamo is more than a prison; it is a “norm-producing” entity (Johns,
2005, 615). The prison camps in Cuba have helped frame the understanding of
the war on terror as premised on biological-political rationalities. The ground of
that reality is the value of life itself, measured by the body of the prisoner.
According to the Red Cross:
The detainee would be photographed, both clothed and naked
prior to and again after transfer. A body cavity check (rectal
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examination) would be carried out and some detainees alleged
that a suppository (the type and the effect of such suppositories
was unknown by the detainees), was also administered at that
moment.
The detainee would be made to wear a diaper and dressed in a
tracksuit. Earphones would be placed over his ears, through
which music would sometimes be played. He would be
blindfolded with at least a cloth tied around the head and black
goggles. In addition, some detainees alleged that cotton wool
was also taped over their eyes prior to the blindfold and goggles
being applied….
The detainee would be shackled by [the] hands and feet and
transported to the airport by road and loaded onto a plane. He
would usually be transported in a reclined sitting position with
his hands shackled in front. The journey times … ranged from
one hour to over twenty-four to thirty hours. The detainee was
not allowed to go to the toilet and if necessary was obliged to
urinate and defecate into the diaper. (Danner, 2009)
These detailed, biopolitical regulations over life and death at Abu Ghraib
surpass any legal regulation of disciplinarity, of the regulation of bodies for the
sake of greater productivity. These are willed regulations, staged for effect, and
designed to diminish resistance. The prison camps of the war on terror do not
represent the appearance of the extension of the legal bureaucratic matrix to the
war on terror or to the application of those who are without a country. The
camps mean that the realm of biopolitics, with its emphasis on the convergence
of “medicine and politics” (Agamben, 1998, 143), seek to achieve the
assimilation of biological existence with political existence (Foucault, 1990b,
142). They are sites for the re-formation of political, cultural, and ethical
understandings of what it is to be human in the twenty-first century. But at their
core, they look back to the twentieth century, not to the regulations of the self
that Foucault detailed in his final works. They are, then, the final integration of
the tactics, techniques, and strategies used during the Third Reich.
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